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Smelcer and Vagle: Foreword: Rethinking Antitrust

FOREWORD: RETHINKING ANTITRUST
Susan Navarro Smelcer and Jeffrey L. Vagle*
After a lengthy period of quiescence, public interest in, and
regulatory activity around, antitrust law have taken on a renewed
vigor.1 Policy shops and think tanks have focused on antitrust as the
antidote for concentrated agricultural sectors, ascendant technology
platforms, wage and employment issues, and more. 2 As of this writing,
new leadership in the Federal Trade Commission and the Department
of Justice’s Antitrust Division seek to rewrite the rules governing
horizontal merger review and publicly seek expanded enforcement
roles across the economy. 3
Why the sudden resurgence of interest around a subject that has
been relatively quiet for nearly four decades? In the postwar era,
antitrust activity was quite robust—due in no small part to the theory
that competition policy, in its goals of spreading economic and
* Assistant Professors of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. Thank you to the editors
and staff of the Georgia State University Law Review, particularly the Symposium Editors, Kacey Baine
and Alexandra Beato, whose extraordinary efforts made this Symposium possible.
1. See generally, Jane Monahan, Turning of the Tide on US antitrust, BANKER (Nov. 11, 2021, 2:49
PM), https://www.thebanker.com/Banking-Regulation-Risk/Politics-Economics/Turning-of-the-tide-onUS-antitrust?ct=true, [https://perma.cc/92PN-ARKB] (“‘There is more dissatisfaction with the antitrust
status quo, with the nature of competition in the US marketplace, than at any point in my lifetime,’ Mr.
Baer affirms. ‘It is one area where there is more bipartisan dissatisfaction than just about any other area
of public policy.’”); Eric Posner, Antitrust is Back in America, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Mar. 12, 2021),
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/biden-big-tech-and-the-return-of-antitrust-by-ericposner-2021-03 [https://perma.cc/D8CF-5U62]; The Growing Demand for More Vigorous Antitrust
Action, ECONOMIST, https://www.economist.com/special-report/2022/01/10/the-growing-demand-formore-vigorous-antitrust-action [https://perma.cc/62NH-GSNW] (Jan. 11, 2022); Lynne Pepall & Dan
Richards, Big-Tech and the Resurgence of Antitrust, ECONOFACT (Jan. 28, 2019),
https://econofact.org/big-tech-and-the-resurgence-of-antitrust [https://perma.cc/34JL-JFXG]; Maurice E.
Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the U.S. Antitrust Movement, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Dec. 15, 2017),
https://hbr.org/2017/12/the-rise-fall-and-rebirth-of-the-u-s-antitrust-movement
[https://perma.cc/AK8K-A329].
2. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dept. Agric., Agriculture Department and Justice Department Issue
Shared Principles and Commitments to Protect Against Unfair and Anticompetitive Practices (Jan. 3,
2022),
https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2022/01/03/agriculture-department-and-justicedepartment-issue-shared [https://perma.cc/JA43-8XST]; Eduardo Porter, A New Legal Tactic to Protect
Workers’
Pay,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
14,
2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/14/business/economy/wages-antitrust-law-us.html
[https://perma.cc/5U5X-6TZW].
3. Monahan, supra note 1; Posner, supra note 1.
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political power to the many rather than the few, was a means of
fighting authoritarianism.4 Starting in the late 1970s, however,
antitrust theory shifted away from non-economic goals, based instead
on benefits to consumers.5 These shifts in policy have not come from
new legislation.6 Indeed, antitrust’s foundational texts have changed
little since their initial writing—a time when steel, oil, and railroads
were matters of chief concern.7 But changing antitrust doctrine, as
pronounced by administrative agencies and courts, is rooted in
evolving economic theory and tools, with courts interpreting the
original statutes through these new lenses.8 Since the last doctrinal
shift, however, economic and political theories have evolved, but
antitrust precedent has been slow to change.9 Recognizing this gap,
policymakers, scholars, and advocates have called for a reexamination
of original antitrust principles to better address contemporary
economic and social issues.10
This Symposium Issue begins with two articles that reflect on
several aspects of the disconnect between the economic reality of our
deeply interconnected economy and economic theory as applied by
agencies and courts. In the first Article of this Issue, Cognitive
Foreclosure, Peter O’Loughlin addresses the shortcomings of rational
choice theory—a foundational assumption of microeconomic
theory—to effectively regulate (or even describe) consumer behavior
in digital markets.
In particular, O’Loughlin examines the role that behavioral
economics may play in antitrust theory and argues for increased
attention to the ways in which companies, particularly technology
4. See, e.g., JEFFRY FRIEDEN, GLOBAL CAPITALISM: ITS RISE AND FALL IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY (2007); Richard N. Cooper, Capsule Review: Antitrust and the Formation of the Postwar
World, FOREIGN AFFS. (2002) (reviewing WYATT WELLS, ANTITRUST AND THE FORMATION OF THE
POSTWAR
WORLD
(2002)),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2002-0501/antitrust-and-formation-postwar-world [https://perma.cc/73HK-SQG5].
5. Stucke & Ezrachi, supra note 1.
6. Id. The rise of the Chicago School of Economics in the late 1970s led to a decline in antitrust
policy and enforcement, “which the Reagan administration endorsed with its enforcement priorities,
judicial appointments, and amicus briefs to the Supreme Court.” Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Monahan, supra note 1.
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companies, can engage in anticompetitive behavior by manipulating
their consumers’ inherent biases and limited information. This
behavior is not new in the digital realm. Similar actions have been the
basis of claims against Microsoft in both the United States and the
European Union, which have been litigated for years.11
But O’Loughlin highlights the increasingly pernicious nature of
firms’ efforts to exploit cognitive biases when the product used by
consumers is a technological black box. These types of products,
O’Loughlin argues, allow technology firms to induce “demand-side
antitrust foreclosure.” Rather than actively foreclosing a rival seller of
transparent tape12 or prescription drugs,13 firms can induce consumers
to foreclose their rivals for them.
Firms’ ability to manipulate consumers is especially pronounced on
digital platforms. Digital purveyors are “uniquely positioned to totally
control . . . and manipulate platform context and interface, product
positions, and information” far beyond the capacity of traditional
brick-and-mortar stores.14 This wholesale control over the consumer
implicates a variety of cognitive responses that makes consumers more
susceptible to manipulation.
Is this behavior anticompetitive? More specifically, does it reach a
level of anticompetitive behavior so as to trigger antitrust investigation
or enforcement? The answers to these questions depend heavily on
which school of antitrust thought is responding. Rational choice theory
is the foundation for modern antitrust law. Behavior short of outright
deception would be an impossibility for a rational actor. But our
understanding of human cognition has shifted over time—and in ways
that are difficult to reconcile with our existing understanding of what
constitutes actionable anticompetitive behavior.
O’Loughlin’s wide-ranging discussion of demand-side foreclosure
points to the need to reinterpret the textual bases of antitrust law in
11. See, e.g., Peter O’Loughlin, Cognitive Foreclosure, 38 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1097, 1120–22 (2022)
(discussing the European Commission’s 2007 ruling that pre-installation of the Window’s Media Player
in Windows constituted an abuse of dominance because it served to foreclose other media players); see
generally Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601.
12. LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).
13. Eisai, Inc. v. Sanofi Aventis U.S., LLC, 821 F.3d 394 (3d Cir. 2016).
14. O’Loughlin, supra note 11, at 1131.

Published by Reading Room, 2022

3

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [2022], Art. 8

2022]

FOREWORD

ix

light of our evolving understanding of human cognition. How we
decide where the boundaries of antitrust lie—and who decides those
boundaries—will play a decisive role in the near future of antitrust
policy.
In this Issue’s second Article, The Abuse of Offsets as
Procompetitive Justifications, Ted Tatos and Hal Singer illustrate how
a traditional element of antitrust analysis—the consumer welfare
standard—has been distorted in its application across platform markets
and in ways that harm workers. The consumer welfare standard has
been described as “the maximization of wealth or consumer want
satisfaction,”15 which occurs when “economic resources are allocated
to their best use . . . and when consumers are assured competitive price
and quality.”16
Tatos and Singer rightly point out that malleability of this standard
poses a danger to consumers within the Supreme Court’s prevailing
approach to evaluating anticompetitive harms: the Rule of Reason.17
When courts evaluate allegedly anticompetitive conduct—such as a
collaboration between competitors or the imposition of non-compete
requirements on vendors—courts will ask whether the allegedly
anticompetitive behavior can be redeemed by any procompetitive
benefits.18 These countervailing procompetitive benefits can be
thought of as “offsets.”19
Courts and agencies have only credited procompetitive offsets that
occur within the same market for the same group of consumers. For

15. Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 7 (1966).
16. Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995).
17. Ted Tatos & Hal Singer, The Abuse of Offsets as Procompetitive Justifications: Restoring the
Proper Role of Efficiencies after Ohio v. American Express and NCAA v. Alston, 38 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
1179, 1185–95 (2022).
18. As Tatos and Singer explain, this is the second step in the burden-shifting “rule-of-reason” analysis
used by courts to assess the legality of potentially anticompetitive conduct under the Sherman Act. First
suggested in Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), the modern rule of
reason first requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct is anticompetitive. Michael
A. Carrier, The Four-Step Rule of Reason¸ 33 ANTITRUST 50, 50 (2019). The burden then shifts to the
defendant to offer a procompetitive justification. Id. The plaintiff must then “demonstrate that the restraint
is not reasonably necessary to achieve the restraint’s objectives or that the defendant’s objectives could
be achieves by less restrictive means.” Id. at 50–51. Finally, the court then evaluates whether the
procompetitive benefits outweigh the anticompetitive harm. Id. at 51.
19. Tatos & Singer, supra note 17, at 1185–91.
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example, Tatos and Singer note that “balancing the harm to consumers
from higher prices . . . against benefits to shareholders from an
increase in the price of a company’s stock” would be not only absurd
but cut against the very purpose of the Sherman Act. 20
But here is where the amorphous boundaries of the consumer
welfare standard make the analysis difficult to pin down. Despite the
obvious absurdity inherent in this argument, Tatos and Singer observe
that defendants may turn to a logical fallacy introduced by the Supreme
Court’s 1986 decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents.21 Here, Tatos and
Singer argue that the Court “laid the groundwork for judicial
acknowledgment of consumer demand for intercollegiate athletics as
a potential offset for worker harms, even though that offset did not take
the form of lower prices, higher output, or improved quality [within
the same market].”22
Courts’ resistance to this obvious absurdity has been further
weakened by the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Ohio v. American
Express. As Tatos and Singer explain, American Express adopted an
understanding of multisided markets that widened an already-cracked
door to claims that procompetitive offsets outside of the market
directly affected by anticompetitive conduct. There, the Court credited
arguments that courts should consider the benefits to consumers
derived from harm imposed on merchants by American Express.
Tatos and Singer’s arguments ring loudly for a statutory repeal of
American Express and clearly illustrate how the fluidity of the
consumer welfare standard harms student-athletes. But they also sound
a clear warning for courts’ analyses of potentially offsetting benefits
across markets. This is especially true for newly emerging digital
markets that, by their very nature, constitute multisided platforms.
Tatos and Singer’s Article raises many unanswered questions about
how courts will analyze these markets. Who is the consumer? Whose
welfare matters when determining who can and will be harmed?

20. Id. at 1189.
21. Id. at 1198 (discussing NCAA v. Board of Regents).
22. Id. at 1199.
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In this Issue’s final piece of scholarship, Student Note, COPPA and
Educational Technologies: The Need for Additional Online Privacy
Protections for Students, Diana Skowronski, J.D. Candidate, 2023,
argues that the emergence of technology-related issues, such as data
privacy, requires regulatory protections that our current laws and
policies fail to achieve. Recent scholarship has explored the possibility
of antitrust law as a possible solution to the problems that have
accompanied the explosive growth of networked technologies,
especially given the enormous economic and social power that has
been consolidated within a relatively few large technology firms.
Skowronski, however, contends that certain areas like data privacy
require their own comprehensive privacy laws, as market competition
alone is unlikely to solve these unique problems. Skowronski’s
Student Note serves as a reminder that the future of antitrust may not
be antitrust at all. Rather, issues that we are discussing today as
potential antitrust issues worthy of enforcement may be better
addressed through a more narrowly tailored regulatory regime.
Where will antitrust enforcement move next? The problems raised
by contemporary markets, firms, and technologies prompt questions
about regulation’s role in a swiftly changing political, legal, social, and
technological landscape. These issues force us to reexamine the
models that we have relied on in the past and ask: Do they still serve
us well? The integration of networked technologies into many facets
of everyday life has brought with it network effects and competitive
dynamics that were not foreseen when the original antitrust statutes
were drafted. Will the continued consumer welfare framing smooth
any bumps in the road ahead, or does it miss noneconomic factors that
may result in more harm than a rise in consumer prices? The
participants in the Symposium fully engaged in this important debate,
highlighting some of the key areas of contention between the differing
schools of thought on competition policy. We hope this Issue will also
play a part in further advancing this conversation.
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